Does Paul Affirm a Works Principle in the Mosaic Covenant?

For all who rely on works of the law are under a curse; for it is written, “Cursed be everyone who does not abide by all things written in the Book of the Law, and do them.” Now it is evident that no one is justified before God by the law, for “The righteous shall live by faith.” But the law is not of faith, rather “The one who does them shall live by them.” Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us—for it is written, “Cursed is everyone who is hanged on a tree”—so that in Christ Jesus the blessing of Abraham might come to the Gentiles, so that we might receive the promised Spirit through faith. —Galatians 3:10–14 (ESV)

Among the Reformed orthodox of the seventeenth century, there was a broad consensus concerning the bicovenantal structure of redemptive history. It was generally agreed that in man’s state of integrity under the covenant of works, the essential condition was Adam’s “perfect and personal obedience” (Westminster Confession of Faith 7.2), while in man’s state of sin under the covenant of grace, the essential condition was faith in Jesus Christ (7.3). On the other hand, the question of the place of the Mosaic covenant within this structure was far more contested. The English Puritan John Ball (1585-1640), regarded as the theologian who most influenced the covenant theology of the Westminster Assembly, once wrote, “Most Divines hold the old [i.e., Mosaic] and new Covenant to be one in substance and kind, to differ only in degrees: but in setting down the differences they speak so obscurely, that it is hard to find how they consent with themselves.”1

Nearly four hundred years later, this disagreement shows no signs of abating. If anything, confusion has only increased, due especially to recent debates over the so-called doctrine of “republication.” This doctrine, associated most closely with Meredith Kline (1922-2007) and his students, teaches that the Mosaic covenant in some sense republished a “works principle” first contained in the covenant of works. But exactly what was this works principle? And in exactly what sense, if any, can it be said to have been republished at Sinai? At the center of the debate over these questions lies the text of Galatians 3:10–14, where the apostle Paul cites a series of Old Testament passages in the context of a broader argument against his Judaizing opponents, who insisted that, in addition to faith in Christ, Torah-observance was a necessary condition for justification.

The implications of this debate are quite far-reaching. They touch on such questions as the relationship of law and gospel, the probation, merit, and reward of Adam, the imputation of the active obedience of Christ, the uses of the law in the life of the Christian, and the bounds of confessional subscription. However, the scope of this paper will be limited to the narrower exegetical issue of Paul’s citation of Lev. 18:5 in Gal. 3:12: “the one who does them [i.e., the commandments] shall live by them” (ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς). The chief question to be addressed is whether and in what sense Paul intended to affirm a works principle in the Mosaic covenant. In addressing this question, I will seek to situate Kline’s republication thesis within a broader taxonomy of views on the Mosaic covenant. I will then evaluate these views in light of the text of Gal. 3:10–14, arguing in defense of the majority Reformed view. That is, I will seek to show that Paul understands the Mosaic covenant to contain a works principle only when it is legalistically misinterpreted and abstracted from its gracious covenantal context. The republication thesis errs primarily due to its reductive focus on the specific role that the Mosaic covenant plays in Paul’s argument in the polemical context of the Galatian controversy. Although Paul stressed the Mosaic covenant’s negative redemptive-historical function in showing Israel the impossibility of justification by law, this fact does not negate its fundamentally gracious character.

A Traditional Taxonomy of Views

As noted above, debates over the Mosaic covenant during the period of Reformed orthodoxy were extraordinarily complex, and it would not be much of an exaggeration to state that there were nearly as many views as there were voices on the subject. Nevertheless, discernible patterns did emerge. The 2016 report of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church’s Study Committee on Republication presents a common historic taxonomy of views on the Mosaic covenant.2 These views are arranged on a spectrum from purely works-based to purely grace-based:

WorksGrace
View 1View 2View 3View 4
Covenant of WorksMixedSubservientCovenant of Grace
Works alone, in essenceWorks + grace, in essencePure works in essence but on temporal levelNo works in essence, only grace

Here I will briefly summarize each view. View 1, most commonly associated with Lutheranism, affirmed the Mosaic covenant to be a covenant of works, pure and simple.3 Although saving grace was certainly available to Israel, such grace was not available through the Mosaic covenant. Rather, the covenant held forth the requirement of perfect obedience in order to show the impossibility of salvation by works. View 2 understood the essence of the Mosaic covenant to be a mixture of both works and grace. This view seems to have been quite rare, and descriptions of it survive largely secondhand by its critics, who faulted it for its incoherence in affirming mutually opposing principles in the same covenant. View 3, sometimes called the “trichotomist” view for positing the Mosaic covenant to be a third type of covenant subservient to the covenant of grace, was associated with John Cameron and the Amyraldians, as well as at least one Westminster divine, Samuel Bolton.4 According to this view, the Mosaic covenant offered Israel the promise of continued temporal life and blessing in the land of Canaan, on condition of perfect obedience to the moral, ceremonial, and judicial laws. As will be seen below, Kline’s doctrine of republication comes quite close to this view, but with some significant modifications. Finally, View 4 represented the majority of the Westminster divines, who considered the Mosaic covenant to be essentially gracious. On this view, the covenant of works is said to be republished at Sinai only in an administrative (rather than substantial) sense. That is, although the same moral law given to Adam was reaffirmed under Moses, and although Israel was reminded of the broken terms of that first covenant, nevertheless Israel was not placed under the same essential condition of works.

An Updated Taxonomy of Views

One disadvantage to the above taxonomy is that it is a bit outdated. Although popular in the 17th century, it does not account for modern exegetical and theological developments. I would therefore propose a different taxonomy, based on two interpretive principles also described in the OPC study committee report. These two principles were first advocated by proponents of View 4 above, in order to account for those passages of Scripture (including Gal. 3:10–14) which initially seem to characterize the Mosaic covenant as a covenant of works. They are labeled the principle of abstraction and the misinterpretation principle, both of which play a useful role in distinguishing between contemporary views, and which interestingly reveal a difference of opinion among followers of Kline.

The principle of abstraction holds that the law, taken in the strictest sense of bare command (as opposed to the Mosaic economy taken broadly), does indeed hold forth the promise of justification, but only on condition of perfect obedience. Such a condition is, of course, unattainable for sinful humanity. Additionally, the misinterpretation principle holds that the Mosaic covenant was essentially gracious according to God’s intention, but the Judaizers legalistically misused it as a means of justification by works. Consequently, Paul is believed to have cited Lev. 18:5 in Gal. 3:12 not in terms of its original meaning, but rather from the rhetorical standpoint of its misinterpretation by his opponents.

Using the above two principles, one may form the following taxonomy, according to whether each view affirms or denies one or both of the principles:

Does Paul affirm a works principle in the Mosaic covenant?
Principle of abstraction
(when taken out of its essentially gracious covenantal context)
Misinterpretation principle
(only when legalistically misappropriated)
View A: John Calvin, Francis Turretin, Herman RidderbosYesYes
View B: Daniel Fuller, Norman Shepherd, Walter KaiserNoYes
View C: T. David Gordon, Jason DeRouchieNoNo
View D: Meredith Kline, Bryan Estelle, Thomas SchreinerYesNo

We may now proceed to describe each view. By a rather substantial margin, View A (essentially coextensive with View 4 in the first taxonomy) has been the majority view within the Reformed tradition, beginning with John Calvin and continuing among many interpreters today.5 It teaches that the Mosaic law was originally meant to be a “rule of life” rather than a “covenant of works.”6 The promised blessings for obedience were a gracious reward—not a wage due—as is also the case in the new covenant.7 Francis Turretin summarizes well both interpretive principles according to this view:

The Mosaic covenant may be viewed in two aspects: either according to the intention and design of God and in order to Christ; or separately and abstracted from him. In the latter way, it is really distinct from the covenant of grace because it coincides with the covenant of works and in this sense is called the letter that killeth and the ministration of condemnation, when its nature is spoken of (2 Cor. 3:6, 7). But it is unwarrantably abstracted here because it must always be considered with the intention of God, which was, not that man might have life from the law or as a sinner might be simply condemned, but that from a sense of his own misery and weakness he might fly for refuge to Christ… The law is said “to be not of faith” (Gal. 3:12), not as taken broadly and denoting the Mosaic economy, but strictly as taken for the moral law abstractly and apart from the promises of grace (as the legalists regarded it who sought life from it).8

View B has become more popular in recent years, although its advocates have either stood outside the Reformed tradition or sought to reformulate it in certain ways. For example, both Daniel Fuller and Norman Shepherd rejected the idea of a works principle even at the abstract level, arguing instead that the essential condition of the Mosaic covenant (as in all other covenants) is “the obedience of faith.”9 Likewise, Walter Kaiser writes, “The law was never intended as an alternative method of obtaining salvation or righteousness—not even hypothetically.”10 From this perspective, Paul’s use of Lev. 18:5 functions only as an ad hominem, arguing from the false premise of his opponents in order to demonstrate its unacceptable logical consequences (“If you say that law-keeping justifies, then see where that actually gets you!”). It is also worth noting that one of the theological implications of this view is a denial of the imputation of the active obedience of Christ, the defense of which was one of the primary motivating factors behind Kline’s republication thesis.11

View C coincides in varying degrees with Views 1–3 in the traditional taxonomy. Recent defenders include T. David Gordon, an advocate and former colleague of Kline, and Jason DeRouchie.12 On this view, the Judaizers in Galatia did not actually misinterpret the meaning of the Mosaic covenant; rather, their error was simply in thinking that they had the ability to fulfill its terms. DeRouchie draws a contrast between the revealed principle contained in the Mosaic law (“the one who does them shall live by them”) and God’s sovereign purpose in producing death and condemnation through it.13 According to DeRouchie, Paul’s expression “the law is not of faith” (Gal. 3:12a) should be taken redemptive-historically, as a description of the characteristic faithlessness of the majority of Israelites during the old covenant (“law”) era. Similarly, Gordon argues that to be “of the works of the law” (ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, Gal. 3:10) does not mean to rely falsely on the law for righteousness, but simply to be under the Mosaic administration, and thereby cursed.14 Further, contrary to Kaiser’s claim that the Mosaic law graciously provided atonement for the people’s imperfections through the sacrificial system, ReRouchie insists upon “the law’s demand for total and perfect surrender.”15 On these terms, it would seem that the sacrificial system functioned only as a gracious appendix to the covenant. Thus the requirement for sinless obedience would not have been a mere abstraction, but rather would have constituted the essential character of the covenant. This means that View B and View C reject the principle of abstraction for opposite reasons: View B because there is no works principle to be abstracted, and View C because there is no gracious context in the Mosaic covenant from which the works principle might be abstracted.16

Kline’s Republication Thesis

In considering View D, I will provide a more detailed description of Kline’s republication thesis. One of the more recent defenses of republication is the multi-author volume The Law Is Not of Faith (or TLNF)—especially the essay by Bryan Estelle, which directly treats Lev. 18:5.17 I have also placed NT scholar Thomas Schreiner and covenant theologian Harrison Perkins in this category, although they do not appear to accept Kline’s reformulation of the concept of merit as described below.18 What all of these interpreters agree upon is that Paul was citing Lev. 18:5 according to the original intention of Moses.19 However, unlike View C, this view holds that the works principle functioned typologically. That is, the condition of Israel’s sincere (albeit imperfect) obedience, and the corresponding reward of life in the land of Canaan, served to foreshadow Christ’s perfect obedience and heavenly reward. Israel was in principle capable of meeting such a condition—and at certain times in its history even did so (such as under Joshua and Caleb)—although the general historical trajectory was toward disobedience and failure.20

One of Kline’s innovations in covenant theology was his redefinition of the category of merit. Within the classical Reformed tradition, there were two commonly accepted forms of merit.21 The first and lesser form was covenant (ex pacto) merit, whereby God voluntarily condescended to attach a heavenly reward disproportionate to creaturely obedience.22 This characterized unfallen Adam, who could not properly merit an infinite reward by virtue of the inherent worth of his finite obedience, but only by virtue of God’s promise.23 The second and greater form was strict merit, where obedience was offered freely (not as a creaturely debt of service; cf. Luke 17:10) and of inherent worth proportionate to the promised reward. This characterized Christ’s obedience as the second Adam. Despite the differences between these two forms of merit, in both cases only perfect, sinless obedience could be meritorious.

Kline’s definition of merit was unique in a number of ways. He was the first covenant theologian to treat the imperfect obedience of fallen humans as meritorious. He did so by rejecting the logical distinction between creation and covenant, thus removing ontology from the concept of merit. That is, for Kline, “There was no original non-covenantal order of mere nature on which the covenant was superimposed.”24 This meant that covenant was no longer a “voluntary condescension” on God’s part (WCF 7.1), but rather essential to the very act of creation.25 It also meant that there could no longer be a distinction between the inherent value of obedience and the value assigned to it by God. But once God assigned the terms of a covenant, he was bound by strict justice to render the promised reward upon fulfillment of the terms. Thus, for Kline, the same kind of merit is operative in all of the covenants of Scripture—including the covenants with Adam, Israel, and Christ. This informs Kline’s definition of the works principle:

Such divine demand for godliness is therefore found in covenants of works and grace alike. The precise kind of conditionality carried by the imposed obligations differs, however, in these two types of covenant. In distinguishing the two varieties of conditionality the key question is that of the function of the response of obedience. If the obedience functions as the meritorious ground of reception or retention of the kingdom blessings, the conditionality is that of the works principle, the opposite of the principle of grace. Obedience functions that way in the eternal covenant of the Father and Son, in the Covenant of the Creator with Adam, and in the Mosaic Covenant at the level of the typological kingdom.26

Kline’s reference to the “typological kingdom” indicates another unique feature of his covenant theology. For Kline, the Mosaic covenant is divided into “lower” and “upper” levels. The lower level corresponds to spiritual blessings for the individual who exercises faith in God’s gospel promises (ordo salutis). On the other hand, the upper level corresponds to temporal blessings for Israel’s national obedience, and on this level the works principle is operative, typologically pointing to the merit of Christ (historia salutis).27 Kline writes:

Classic covenantalism recognizes that the old Mosaic order (at its foundational level—that is, as a program of individual salvation in Christ) was in continuity with previous and subsequent administrations of the overarching covenant of grace. But it also sees and takes at face value the massive Biblical evidence for a peculiar discontinuity present in the old covenant in the form of a principle of meritorious works, operating not as a way of eternal salvation but as the principle governing Israel’s retention of its provisional, typological inheritance.28

Kline’s use of the expression “classic covenantalism” here is somewhat misleading, for no previous covenant theologian is known to have used the language of “meritorious works” in reference to Israel’s national obedience.29 Nevertheless, Kline’s two-tier conceptualization of the Mosaic covenant explains how he can affirm both that it is an administration of the covenant of grace and also that it contains a works principle antithetical to grace.

Exegesis of Galatians 3:10–14

Having described each view, we may now attempt to evaluate them in light of the text of Gal. 3:10–14. Doing so is unfortunately not a straightforward task; it is complicated by consideration of the meaning of Lev. 18:5 in its original OT setting (not to mention the other OT texts cited by Paul here, including Deut. 27:26; Hab. 2:4; and Deut. 21:23), as well as Paul’s second use of Lev. 18:5 in Rom. 10:5 (where it is juxtaposed with a citation of Deut. 30:11–14 in Rom. 10:6–8). Analyzing all of the details of each of these texts would be a massive undertaking, so here I will limit my focus to presenting a summary of the context of Paul’s conflict in Galatia, followed by an analysis of the logical flow of thought in Gal. 3:10–14, and then a more systematic treatment of Paul’s view of the Mosaic law.

Concerning context, although there is some debate over the specific beliefs of Paul’s opponents in Galatia, it is clear enough that Paul considered their fundamental error to be a misunderstanding of the relationship between the Mosaic law and justification.30 These opponents—commonly referred to as “Judaizers” by interpreters—were requiring that Gentile converts to Christianity submit to the ceremonial requirements of the Torah (Gal. 2:14), such as circumcision (5:2; 6:12–13), the Jewish calendar (4:10), and possibly kosher dietary restrictions (2:12; cf. Rom. 14:14–23).31 In response to these agitators, Paul begins his letter to the Galatians with an uncharacteristically abrupt rebuke to his readers (1:6–10), followed by a defense of his apostleship (1:11–2:10), and then a recounting of his confrontation with Peter over table fellowship with Gentile believers (2:11–14). This leads directly into the theological portion of the letter, in which Paul defends the doctrine of justification by faith rather than by works of the law. It is likely that the Judaizers held up Abraham as a paradigm of righteousness, insisting that only those who submitted to circumcision like Abraham were the true sons of Abraham.32 One might imagine that they appealed to passages like Gen. 17:9–14 to insist upon the perpetual obligation of circumcision as an “everlasting covenant.” Paul therefore appeals to Abraham in order to establish precisely the opposite point: Abraham was justified by faith, so that the promised blessing might flow to the Gentiles (Gal. 3:6–9).

Paul then draws a contrast in Gal. 3:10–14 between law/works/curse on the one hand, and righteousness/faith/blessing on the other—constituting the central argument (and arguably also the most intensely debated section) of the entire letter. Ben Dunson frames Paul’s flow of thought here as a five-step argument, all but one step being supported by a direct OT citation:33

  1. The negative effect of the law is to curse those of the works of the law. (Deut. 27:26)
  2. The positive effect of faith is to justify. (Hab. 2:4)
  3. No one has perfectly kept the law. (Implied premise)
  4. The positive effect of the law is to give life to those who do it perfectly. (Lev. 18:5)
  5. Christ’s work on the cross diverts the curse to himself from those who do not do the law but have faith. (Deut. 21:23)

This framing of Paul’s argument is by no means uncontroversial. Especially disputed is the implied premise in step 3—namely, that no one can perfectly keep the requirements of the law. Such a reading has been quite common in the Protestant tradition since Luther and Calvin, but it has recently been challenged—especially in the wake of the New Perspective on Paul. E.P. Sanders has argued that it would be absurd to claim that the Torah required sinless perfection, given the possibility of atonement through the sacrificial system.34 And yet Schreiner counters:

But such an argument would not convince Paul, for now that Christ has come, OT sacrifices no longer atone. Atonement is reserved for Christ’s sacrifice alone. Hence, those who return to the law are restricted to the law covenant and its sacrifices for the forgiveness of sins. Now that Christ has come, however, no atonement is available under the law or its sacrifices. Therefore, the only way to gain life under the law is to keep every provision of the law.35

This response may help resolve the objection, but only partly. From Paul’s perspective, Torah-keeping is certainly an impossibility now that Christ’s work has rendered the sacrificial system obsolete, but this fact alone might imply that no problem existed for observant Jews before the coming of Christ, when the sacrificial system was still in effect. And yet, in addressing the same conflict with the Judaizers at the Jerusalem Council, Peter asks, “Why are you putting God to the test by placing a yoke on the neck of the disciples that neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear” (Acts 15:10, emphasis added)?

Contrary to advocates of View C, I do not think this means that the Mosaic covenant per se was meant to be an unbearable burden. Rather, it was the wrong use to which Israel put it which made it unbearable, pursuing their own righteousness “as if it were based on works” (Rom. 9:32). Thus, the implied inability in step 3 above need not be taken as a general anthropological judgment on Paul’s part (although Paul certainly would have agreed with such a judgment), but rather as a judgment about the inability specifically of those who seek works-righteousness. Moisés Silva comments:

When Paul speaks of “as many as are of law-works”… he has primarily in mind neither people in general (Jews and Gentiles) nor Judaism as a whole, but rather the Judaizers whom he opposes and therefore anyone, Jew or Gentile, who followed the Judaizers’ teaching.36

Paul would certainly refuse to admit that the Judaizers had kept the law in any meaningful sense. Rather, he insists, “Even those who are circumcised do not themselves keep the law” (Gal. 6:13). And his declaration that “every man who accepts circumcision” is “obligated to keep the whole law” (5:3) makes most sense if taken as a reductio ad absurdum, implying the legalist’s inability to keep the whole law. Elsewhere, Paul can refer to these “mutilators of the flesh” (that is, those who insist on circumcision) as “dogs” and “evildoers” (Phil. 3:2), despite their zeal in Torah observance.37

What then are we to make of Paul’s use of Lev. 18:5 in Gal. 3:12, where he contrasts law and faith? Paul has already established the negative effect of the law in cursing those who wrongly use it as a means of justification. So what further purpose does stating the positive effect of the law serve? It may be that Paul is seeking to emphasize the impossible position that his opponents have put themselves in. This is accomplished by highlighting the contrast between “faith” and “doing,” placing the blessings of the law in the latter category. And yet justification is not one of those blessings, nor was it ever meant to be. As Stephen Myers argues, justification and law belong to different economies, and to ascribe the blessings of one economy to the other is a fundamental category error.38 It is not simply that Paul is quoting Lev. 18:5 as refracted through its legalistic misinterpretation; there is indeed a kind of “works principle” operative in the Mosaic covenant, but it is not the kind that the Judaizers affirm. Myers uses the following analogy:

Imagine a parallel situation with the human body. Each man, woman, and child needs both refreshment and fitness. Refreshment comes through rest. Fitness comes through exertion. All of these activities are good and beneficial for the body. Refreshment, rest, fitness, exertion—all of these are beneficial. But they also are different. And given the close connections between them, it would be foolish to pursue further exertion when you need refreshment. Exertion is good, but refreshment does not come through exertion. Refreshment comes through rest, and exertion is clearly not connected to rest. Exertion is wonderful, but it is useless for something that it never was intended to do in the first place.39

This reading makes good sense of Lev. 18:5 in its original context, where God declares his commandments to a people already redeemed (Ex. 15:13; 20:2). In theological terms, one could say that the law was given for sanctification, not for justification. And for the faithful Israelite, these blessings of the law were real, not merely hypothetical.

Such a principle is also operative in the new covenant. Paul himself can quote the law in his instructions to believers and reaffirm its promised reward: “that it may go well with you and that you may live long in the land” (Eph. 6:3). Peter similarly exhorts believers, “Bless, for to this you were called, that you may obtain a blessing” (1 Pet. 3:9–12). Even in Galatians, Paul acknowledges a reward for doing good:

…For whatever one sows, that will he also reap. For the one who sows to his own flesh will from the flesh reap corruption, but the one who sows to the Spirit will from the Spirit reap eternal life. And let us not grow weary of doing good, for in due season we will reap, if we do not give up. (Gal 6:8–9)

Given the associations of the concept of a “works principle” with justification and merit, it would perhaps be better to speak of this as a “gracious reward” principle instead. Turretin describes the difference well:

From a reward to merit, the consequence does not hold good. One reward is of debt; another of grace (Rom. 4:4)…. Life is promised to works as a reward, but as a gratuitous and undue reward (which is the gift of God, Rom. 6:23) and an inheritance (as has been said) obtained not by the right of merit, but by the privilege of sonship—however, the exercise of good works coming in as a necessary condition. On this account, it is proposed as wages and a reward in order to excite believers to diligence, not to foster pride; but this gratuitous reward (which follows our labors) no more proves merit than the buying in the prophet proves a price of money (Is. 55:1, 2). Hence what is called misthos (Mt. 5:46; 6:1) is elsewhere called charis (Lk. 6:32); and children (or the fruit of the womb) are called a reward, who nevertheless are the gift of God (Ps. 127:3).40

There is one more element in Paul’s reasoning that needs consideration. Although one finds continuity between the old and new covenants in the “gracious reward” principle, there is also a significant point of discontinuity: the Holy Spirit. The giving of the Spirit through faith is the culmination of God’s plan for his people (Gal. 3:14). For Paul, true obedience apart from the Spirit’s indwelling is unthinkable. To be sure, Paul as a former Pharisee had considered himself “blameless” with respect to the righteousness under the law (Phil. 3:6). But such righteousness was merely outward. Indeed, Spirit-less obedience is the “yoke” described by Peter, which their Jewish forefathers were unable to bear (Acts 15:10). For the believer in Christ, the law is fulfilled in walking by the Spirit, for those “led by the Spirit” are not “under the law” (Gal. 5:18). According to the Old Testament promises, the Holy Spirit is the agent of redemptive transformation, the one who internalizes the law in the believer’s heart (Ezek. 36:26–27; Joel 2:28–32). It is therefore not inappropriate to speak of the Mosaic covenant as a “ministry of death” (2 Cor. 3:7), but not because it is a substantial republication of the covenant of works. Rather, it is because the Holy Spirit, the power for true obedience, had not yet been poured out on God’s people, and thus Israel had largely misappropriated the law as a covenant of works, to be obeyed by their own fleshly effort.

Conclusion

So where does all this leave us with respect to Kline’s doctrine of republication? If the above interpretation is correct, then it follows that Kline greatly exaggerates the discontinuities between the old and new covenants. Kline was correct to recognize that the Mosaic covenant (taken broadly) required only sincere obedience, and that the promised blessings were in principle realizable, even if Israel’s national history ultimately proved the inevitability of failure and the need for a better covenant. Moreover, I do not think that Kline was necessarily wrong about a works principle in the abstract sense, although such a principle seems to be absent from Paul’s reasoning in Galatians and would need to be established on other grounds. However, to speak of a meritorious typological works principle in the Mosaic covenant creates more problems than it solves. If, as I have argued, Lev. 18:5 affirms a principle still in effect in the new covenant era, then following Kline’s reformulation of merit would place Christians in the implausible position of meriting something before God. On the other hand, when our view of the Mosaic covenant is expanded to include the larger context of both Testaments rather than a narrow focus on Paul’s conflict in Galatia, then we find that the law is opposed not to grace, but only to justification.

  1. John Ball, A Treatise of the Covenant of Grace, quoted in Joel Beeke and Mark Jones, A Puritan Theology: Doctrine for Life (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2012), 391. ↩︎
  2. The OPC Report of the Committee to Study Republication, 2016, https://www.opc.org/GA/ republication.html. Similar taxonomies are also found in the writings of 17th-century Reformed theologians such as John Ball, Anthony Burgess, Francis Roberts, and Francis Turretin. ↩︎
  3. Although not mentioned in the OPC report, View 1 also represents the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith, which made substantial revisions to chapter 7 (Of God’s Covenant with Man) of the Westminster Confession of Faith. See https://www.the1689confession.com/. ↩︎
  4. This view is also described in Beeke and Jones, 381–384. ↩︎
  5. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion III.11.17–18; Andrew Elam, Robert Van Kooten, and Randall Bergquist, Merit and Moses: A Critique of the Klinean Doctrine of Republication (Wipf and Stock, 2014); Cornelis Venema, Christ and Covenant Theology: Essays on Election, Republication, and the Covenants (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2017); Stephen G. Myers, God to Us: Covenant Theology in Scripture (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage, 2021). ↩︎
  6. See John Maynard, The Law of God Ratified by the Gospel of Christ (London, 1674), 263–64, for an elaboration on this distinction. ↩︎
  7. John Murray, Principles of Conduct (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958), 199–200, writes: “In all this the demand of obedience in the Mosaic covenant is principally identical with the same demand in the new covenant of the gospel economy.” ↩︎
  8. Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, ed. James T. Dennison, trans. George Musgrave Giger, 3 vols. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1994), 2:267–68. ↩︎
  9. Daniel Fuller, Gospel and Law: Contrast or Continuum? (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1980), 105; Norman Shepherd, The Call of Grace: How the Covenant Illuminates Salvation and Evangelism (Phillipsburg, NJL P&R, 2001), 39. ↩︎
  10. Walter Kaiser, Five Views on Law and Gospel, ed. Stanley Gundry (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1996), 178. See also Klyne Snodgrass, “A Theology of Revelation,” in Gospel in Paul: Studies on Corinthians, Galatians, and Romans for Richard N. Longenecker, ed. L. Ann Jervis and Peter Richardson (T&T Clark, 1994), 313: “Law was never a valid means of salvation—not even hypothetically.” ↩︎
  11. In fairness, not even all the members of the Westminster Assembly were in agreement concerning the imputation of the active obedience of Christ. Thomas Gataker, Richard Vines, and William Twisse were notable dissenters. See Robert Letham, The Westminster Assembly (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2009), 253–264. ↩︎
  12. T. David Gordon, “Abraham and Sinai Contrasted in Galatians 3:6–14,” in The Law Is Not of Faith, ed. Bryan Estelle, J.V. Fesko, and David VanDrunen (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2009), 240–258; Jason DeRouchie, “The Use of Leviticus 18:5 in Galatians 3:12: A Redemptive-Historical Reassessment,” Themelios 45.2 (August 2020), 240–259. Although Gordon defends Kline’s doctrine of republication, his antithesis between the Abrahamic and Mosaic covenants is starker than Kline’s, warranting a different categorization. ↩︎
  13. DeRouchie, 243. ↩︎
  14. Gordon, 244–246. ↩︎
  15. DeRouchie, 250. See Kaiser, “Leviticus 18:5 and Paul: Do This and You Shall Live (Eternally?),” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 14 (1971), 25: “One of the ways of ‘doing’ the law was to recognize the imperfection of one’s life and thus to make a sacrifice for the atonement of one’s sins.” ↩︎
  16. To clarify, View C would affirm the graciousness of the context beyond Sinai—namely, the covenant of grace in its totality—not of the context within Sinai. ↩︎
  17. Bryan Estelle, “Leviticus 18:5 and Deuteronomy 30:1–14 in Biblical Theological Development: Entitlement to Heaven Foreclosed and Proffered,” in TLNF, 109–146. ↩︎
  18. Thomas Schreiner, Galatians, Zondervan Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament, ed. Clinton Arnold (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2010), 199–222. Harrison Perkins, Reformed Covenant Theology: A Systematic Introduction (Bellingham, WA: Lexham 2024). ↩︎
  19. Schreiner, 213, admits that he was previously persuaded of the misinterpretation principle but later changed his mind. ↩︎
  20. Estelle, 118n45. ↩︎
  21. Elam et al., 49–58. ↩︎
  22. Again, it should be noted that the Westminster divines were not all in agreement concerning Adam’s reward, although a majority regarded the reward as indefectible heavenly life. Thomas Goodwin, however, believed that Adam could merit only continued earthly life in the garden. See Beeke and Jones, 301–303. ↩︎
  23. Reformed orthodox theologians frequently stressed that God’s covenant with Adam was “gracious.” Ibid, 303–306. ↩︎
  24. Meredith Kline, Kingdom Prologue: Genesis Foundations for a Covenantal Worldview (Wipf and Stock, 2006), 92. ↩︎
  25. Elam et al., 61–65. ↩︎
  26. Kline, 318. ↩︎
  27. Elam et al., 71–72. ↩︎
  28. Meredith Kline, “Gospel Until the Law: Rom 5:13–14 and the Old Covenant,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 34.4 (December 1991), 434. ↩︎
  29. Perhaps the closest candidate to a forerunner to Kline is Herman Witsius (1636–1708), who describes the Mosaic covenant as formally neither a covenant of works nor a covenant of grace, but rather as “a national covenant between God and Israel, whereby Israel promised to God a sincere obedience to all his precepts, especially to the ten words; God, on the other hand, promised to Israel, that such an observance would be acceptable to him, nor want its reward, both in this life, and in that which is to come, both as to soul and body.” Witsius, The Economy of the Covenants between God and Man: Comprehending a Complete Body of Divinity, trans. William Crookshank, 2 vols. (1822; repr., Escondido, CA: Den Dulk Foundation, 1990), 2:168; quoted in Cornelis Venema, Christ and Covenant Theology: Essays on Election, Republication, and the Covenants (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2017), 99. ↩︎
  30. Ben Dunson, “‘The Law Evidently Is Not Contrary to Faith’: Galatians and the Republication of the Covenant of Works,” Westminster Theological Journal 79 (2017), 245–248; Schreiner, 31–35. ↩︎
  31. The term “Judaizer” is somewhat a misnomer, for Paul’s use of the term “Judaize” (ἰουδαΐζω) in Gal. 2:14 refers not to the opponents themselves, but to the Gentile converts who were tempted to adopt Jewish customs. See Dunson, 245n6. ↩︎
  32. Schreiner, 34. ↩︎
  33. Dunson, 248–252. ↩︎
  34. “It would, in short, be extraordinarily un-Pharisaic and even un-Jewish of Paul to insist that obedience of the law, once undertaken, must be perfect. Such a position would directly imply that the means of atonement specified in Scripture itself were of no avail.” E.P. Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 28. See also Kaiser in n15. ↩︎
  35. Schreiner, 205. ↩︎
  36. Silva, “Galatians,” in Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament, ed. G.K. Beale and D.A. Carson (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2007), 799. This also contradicts Gordon’s claim that ἐξ ἔργων νόμου refers to the Mosaic covenant simpliciter (see n14 above). ↩︎
  37. Ibid. Silva also notes how the inability premise finds further support in the fact that it makes Gal. 3:11a (“now it is evident that no one is justified before God by the law”) a logical consequence of the preceding verse (“all who rely on works of the law”), rather than simply an additional piece of information. Ibid, 801. ↩︎
  38. Myers, 219–224. ↩︎
  39. Ibid, 222. ↩︎
  40. Turretin, 2:718. ↩︎
Kyle Dillon's avatar

About Kyle Dillon

A teaching elder in the Presbyterian Church in America (PCA), assistant pastor of theological instruction at Riveroaks Reformed Presbyterian Church, and theology/rhetoric teacher at Westminster Academy in Memphis, Tennessee.

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